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REVIEWS

of the defendant in and of themselves constitute a generally recognized wrong," if
so, we then proceed to inquire into possible defenses.
This is not only confusing but especially
unnecessary in the restatement treatment
of defamation since it includes a chapter
on defenses. It should be noticed that fair
comment and criticism are treated as defenses to defamation. This again is contrary to the traditional procedural development of the law of defamation. Fair
comment is not defamation at all and the
"defense" is available under a negative
plea. Fair comment should be treated as
a separate but related topic. The purpose
of the restatement is not to amend the
law but to state it as it is.
The chapter on Burden of Proof is not
tort law and should have been omitted
from a work already too large.
Usually violations of rights in the fields
of Trade Regulation and Labor Relations
are proper subjects for actions in Tort for
damages, and the cases involving such
matters rest upon a foundation of supposed substantive rights. But should a
restatement of tort law undertake to include in such an ambitious way the whole
matter of these two subjects, which are
now so much subject to statute (particularly Federal statutes), and which to a
considerable degree have been developed
as a part of the expansion of equity jurisdiction?
One reading this volume and remembering the length to which it has run and
comparing it with some of the other restatements cannot down the suspicion
that it has been padded.
The Torts Restatement has not been
made a concise workable statement of the
great and essential fundamentals of that
field of law, but a catch all for things
which to be sure historically developed out
of the actions of trespass and case,
but today in their practical operation are
so largely dealt with in other connections
that it is an imposition to expect the lawyer who sets out to buy a book on torts
to pay for the whole hodge-podge.
Much of the material on domestic relations is so largely concerned with the law
usually treated in books devoted to domestic relations about which the writer
knows so little that he hesitates to comment.

Finally I come to the expression of a
dissatisfaction which I have felt throughout as to the comments. There is either
too much or too little in this respect, to
wit: in the comment and illustrations one
encounters statements of the essential
facts of many familiar cases. There are
statements apparently of other real cases
which I am unable to identify. I cannot
but feel that the Bench would take more
kindly to the restatement and use it more
freely and extensively if these comments
cited the cases whose facts are actually
drawn upon and stated as illustrations.
Caveat, (this being a favorite expression
of the reporters in the restatement) I am
not suggesting a mass of citations. This
criticism is one which the writer has heard
many persons make with respect to all
the restatements, but this practice is evidently in pursuance of the considered
policy of the American Law Institute.
Whether or not one agrees with the
statements of rules in the restatements of
torts, or any other subject, the fact remains that these restatements are becoming increasingly important. Although the
restatements are not authority they are
serving as sources for authority. Those
who have their legal being in the jurisdictions where there are already several
hundred volumes of reports, perhaps do
not realize how often the courts of last
resort in the newer states, when presented
with a case of first impression, take down
the appropriate restatement and apply
and quote it rather than attempt to discriminate between the lines of reasoning
employed by "conflicting authorities" in
other jurisdictions, or trouble themselves
to count noses in the effort to follow the
"weight of authority."
For reasons such as this it is dreadfully
important that a restatement should be
well done. Has it been satisfactorily done
in the third volume on torts?
LESTER

W. FEEZER.*

HANDBOOK OF Tm CONFLICT OF LAws
(Second Edition), by Herbert F. Goodrich.1 St. Paul: West Publishing Co.
1938. Pp. xiv, 624. $5.00.
"Goodrich on Conflict of Laws" has,
since 1927, the date of publication of the
*Professor of Law, University of Arizona.
'Dean of University of Pennsylvania Law
School.
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first edition, become a familiar citation in
opinions of courts and critical writings.
Several generations of law students have
found solace in its pages. Indeed, many
law teachers, including the reviewer, have
derived untold assistance from it. A new
edition of so important a book deserves
somewhat more than passing comment.
A good deal of water has gone over the
Conflict of Laws dam since Dean Goodrich's first effort. The law magazines have
carried many learned articles, there is
more than the usual accumulation of case
law, the Supreme Court has settled several important questions and unsettled as
many others. The Restatement of Conflict
of Laws has finally been permitted to see
the light of day, and, what is quite as important, been subjected to the searching
review of the learned world. On the
whole, an highly complex area of the law
is, in 1938, scarcely less chaotic than it
was in 1927.
It cannot be said that Dean Goodrich,
in his second edition, has materially reduced the chaos. One would expect, under
the circumstances, that the author would
revisit the premises on which his original
structure had been based, and subject his
postulates to critical reexamination. This,
the dean seems not to have done. So far
as concerns the doctrinal basis of the
work, the second edition differs in no important particular from the first. Indeed,
in neither edition has the author taken the
pains clearly to set forth the terms of his
thinking, although in both the implications are at once obvious.
Perhaps it is an injustice to charge that
the author has not taken the "pains" to
state and defend his premises. It is more
accurate to state that he has not had the
interest to do so. Obviously the author
has very little concern over the raging
controversy concerning the rational and
legal basis of this branch of the law. Although seldom articulated, it is the so.
called "vested right" theory that predominates throughout the book. It was good
enough for the first edition and it is good
2

Section 7.

Cf. also Section 18 where it is
said that "the forum will apply its own law to
determine questions of domicile."
4 The constitutional difficulty appears in the
3 Section 78.
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enough for the second. Moreover, the
naive reader would hardly suspect that
the theory has weaknesses that have been
subjected to devastating attack. The reviewer is, on the whole, inclined to discount this inadequacy. After all, there
are definite limits to what can be done in
a small handbook. The weakness of all
such enterprises, as the reviewer well
knows, is the necessity for deceptive oversimplification. Nevertheless, such books
are supposed to be of some value, and
it is an impertinent criticism that the
author of such a book has not transcended
the obstacles which inhere in the character of the work itself.
Within the limits of what may be expected of a hornbook, the author has
achieved satisfactory results in bringing
up to date his original volume. There
is, of course, a new chapter on Taxation.
Important new decisions in other parts
are noted and discussed. Recent periodical literature is canvassed on particular problems. The Restatement is cited
frequently both in text and notes.
The troublesome problem of the renvoi
is treated in a new section.2 Probably no
one should expect a satisfactory treatment
of this matter in the type of book under
review. The fact remains, however, that
it does not receive satisfactory exposition. Nor does the problem of qualification fare better. The usual dogma gets a
black letter in the case of the problems
of substance or procedure. 3 The "law of
the forum" governs, subject to the limitations of the federal Constitution. 4 Embarrassing cases like Precourtv. Driscolls
and Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co.6
are not discussed.
The dean guessed wrong on the problem whether the principle of res judicata
is applicable to a finding of domicile in
divorce litigation. "Jurisdiction of a
court over subject matter or status is
probably always open to collateral attack,"
states the black letterJ although it is
followed by the qualification that there
is "some authority" to the contrary. It
decision in John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Yates, 299 U. S.178 (1936).
585 N. H. 280, 157 Ati. 525 (1931).
6252 N. Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112 (1929).
7 Section 20.
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could have been but a short time after
the book went to press that the Supreme
Court made the authority final.8
Conspicuous for its absence in the first
edition was an adequate treatment of the
many troublesome problems connected
with powers of foreign corporations and
the legal effect of their ultra vires acts.
The second edition discloses no additional
learning on this subject.
On the question of jurisdiction to annul
a marriage, the author has shifted from
his original position that jurisdiction to
annul is "on principle, vested only in the
courts of the state which determines the
validity of the marriage"9 to the principle that such jurisdiction "is vested only
in the courts of the domicile of the
parties."' 0
Although the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson"l was not mentioned in the first
edition, the problem receives a section in
the revised work. "Since 1842," we are
told, "as a result of the well known decision of Mr. Justice Story in Swift v.
Tyson, the federal courts have often applied a Conflict of Laws rule which differed from that of the courts of the state
in which they sat. .

.

.

Recently, the

Supreme Court, by overruling Swift
12 v.
It
Tyson, has abolished this doctrine."'
is true, of course, that in many cases, federal courts have applied a Conflict of
Laws rule that differed from that of the
state in which they sat. It is also true,
that in some cases, the federal courts declined to apply any Conflict of Laws rule
at all, relying on Swift v. Tyson to enable
them to apply the rule of decision as to
the merits of the case, as determined by
the federal courts. The effect of Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins,"3 therefore, is considerably more far reaching than indicated by
the author.
These criticisms, are mentioned because
they seem to the writer to be exceptions
to the prevailing excellency of the volume.
It is the time honored function of a book
review to elaborate trivial exceptions and
treat them as if they were typical of the
entire book. Among hornbooks, "Goods Davis v. Davis, 59 S. Ct. 3 (1938).
9 Section 130 (first edition).
10 Section 131 (second edition).
"141 U. S. 1 (1842).
12 Section

12.

rich on Conflict of Laws" will for many
years, stand out as one of the best. The
publishers have done justice to a good
manuscript by maintaining their usual
high standard of manufacture. One complaint seems pertinent. Many readers
would be pleased if the dates of cases
were included in the citations, a practice
followed in some of the hornbooks. A
table of cases and a reasonably adequate
index conclude the volume.
FowLER V. HARPER.*
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTioN, by Benjamin Fletcher Wright,
Jr.' Cambridge: Harvard University
Press. 1938. Pp. xvii, 287. $3.50.
It is highly desirable that a review of
any book take due account of the purposes
for which it was written. The author's
purpose has not been to write a text which
lawyers might consult as an authoritative
source of the law that has been judicially
developed on the basis of the Contract
Clause of the federal Constitution. He has
aimed rather to treat that judicial process
as an historical example of the inevitable
problem of reconciling the security of
private property with the existence of
majority rule in a democratically conceived and organized government. The
author has, accordingly, been particularly
interested in portraying the forces that
were operative in giving The Contract
Clause the particular scope that it has had
during the stages of its judicial development, and in giving the historical back-'
ground for the struggles that were the
inevitable incidents of that process. He has
also stressed the economic significance of
particular applications of that Clause, and
the importance of those applications upon
the problems of governmental adjustments of policy as new developments have
produced changes in views as to the desirable extent of governmental interposition in the community's economic and social life. The test of the book is the extent
to which the author has achieved these
objectives.
13 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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